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Some scholars have presented codiﬁcation as a means to both nationalise and
denationalise European legal traditions. This seems to be a paradox. On the
one hand, the fact that laws needed to be approved by national parliaments
and the ius commune – which was somehow regarded as a foreign law –
ceased to be in force, gives evidence of how much codiﬁcation contributed
to the nationalisation of law. On the other hand, the fact that national
parliaments enacted codes whose content had been highly inﬂuenced by
foreign codes reveals that codiﬁcation also contributed to the
denationalisation of law. Different perspectives and arguments may lead to
completely opposite outcomes. This debate has been particularly present in
the Spanish scholarship. In the end, it seems that the view of codiﬁcation as
a means of denationalisation of law has prevailed, giving either a biased
and partisan view of codiﬁcation, or simplifying its richness. The
consequences of such an approach have been notable in describing the
codiﬁcation of all legal branches, particularly in the civil law domain. After
the Introduction (I), the paper will explore the Spanish historiography on
this matter in a European context (II.1), paying particular attention to
Belgium (II.2) and Romania (II.3). I will ﬁnish with some concluding
considerations (III).
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I. Introduction
Could we imagine Napoleon promulgating the Code civil as a mere subsidiary law,
that is, only applicable when no regional custom or legal provision was found?
Can we imagine the French civil code giving a general sanction to custom or
natural sense as legal sources or explicitly prescribing the binding force of case
law? If that was the case, it is probable that Continental codes would not have
been presented as a determining technique to achieve legal uniﬁcation and legal
positivism. European Codes would have been regarded as perfectly compatible
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with non-legal sources (custom, judicial precedent, legal doctrine) and with legal
diversity. Had this been the case, it could have been said with conﬁdence that the
Spanish civil code followed in the French model’s footsteps. It would have been
easier to recognise the French code as the model of the Spanish civil code and,
most probably, non-Spanish legal historians and comparative lawyers would not
ﬁnd it that difﬁcult to understand the codiﬁcation of civil law in Spain.
The reality is, however, different. The promulgation of the Code civil entailed
the uniﬁcation of the French civil law (by abolishing all regional and customary
laws), whereas the Spanish civil code was promulgated under the express require-
ment of maintaining the validity of existing regional laws. The example of Spain
shows that codiﬁcation does not necessarily imply legal uniﬁcation.1 In fact, Spain
constitutes the only case in which the application of the civil code is merely sub-
sidiary, that is, when regional laws do not contain a legal rule applicable to solve a
legal dispute. In explaining this from a historical and comparative perspective,
non-Spanish scholars usually identify regional laws (Derechos forales) with
fueros, customs and local laws, but this is not entirely true. Since no other civil
law jurisdiction can be used as a model to describe the Spanish case, which on
this matter is unique, elsewhere I asked myself: ‘Should legal uniqueness be com-
pared?’ Or perhaps even better: ‘Can legal uniqueness be compared?’ That was
precisely the title of a recent work where I focused on the uniqueness of the
Spanish case in codifying its civil law, trying to dispel some myths and misunder-
standings on the notion of codiﬁcation in general, and on the Spanish civil code in
particular.2
I do not dare to suggest that the Spanish civil code cannot be compared. But I
do submit that one should be careful in comparing it or, in other words, the com-
parison should be properly done. Otherwise, some comparisons or comparative
law categories might not accommodate the peculiarities of the Spanish Codiﬁca-
tion of civil law. In this regard, I argued that three shortcomings can be found when
non-Spanish legal historians and comparative lawyers deal with the Spanish civil
code: (1) regarding Spanish civil code as a second-rate codiﬁcation because it did
not fully achieve legal uniﬁcation (according to the French model); (2) overlook-
ing the important peculiarities of the Spanish civil law system, with its richness
and complexity; and (3) lack of understanding of the way different legal
systems or traditions operate in Spain, confusing the category of ‘foral laws’
(‘Derechos forales’) with ‘local laws’ (‘Derechos locales’) or ‘customs’
(‘costumbres’).
1Aniceto Masferrer, ‘Plurality of Laws, Legal Diversity and Codiﬁcation in Spain’ (2011) 4
Journal of Civil Law Studies 419.
2Aniceto Masferrer and Juan B Cañizares, ‘Should Legal Uniqueness Be Compared? The
Spanish Civil Code: Its Subsidiary Character’ in A Albarian and O Moréteau (eds), Com-
parative law and… / Droit Comparé et… (Presses universitaires d’Aix-Marseille, 2015)
85.
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All of these shortcomings are due to taking for granted the fact that Spanish
drafters used the French civil code extensively as a model – copying most of
the French provisions – and the lack of knowledge of Spanish legal traditions.
Being aware of it, in previous works I have tried to addressed some of these mis-
understandings.3 Whereas some Spanish legal historians have stressed some
peculiarities of the Spanish codiﬁcation,4 only more recently has the particular
extent of French – and other foreign inﬂuences – been properly emphasised.5 In
doing so, it has been shown, for example, how the French inﬂuence over
Europe and Latin America changed throughout the nineteenth century.6 In
Spain, the French inﬂuence over the Committees in charge of drafting the civil
code notably diminished after the rejection of the García Goyena Project
(1851).7 In Latin America, such change also took place in the middle of the nine-
teenth century, after the publication of the García Goyena Project and the enact-
ment of the Civil Codes of Perú (1852) and Chile (1855).8
However, Spanish scholars should have made a greater effort to put more
emphasis on the subsidiary validity of the Spanish civil code from a comparative
3See Masferrer, ‘Plurality of Laws, Legal Diversity’ (n 1); Masferrer and Cañizares (n 2);
see also Aniceto Masferrer, ‘Plurality of Laws and Ius Commune in the Spanish Legal Tra-
ditions: The Cases of Catalonia and Valencia’ in Seán Donlan and Dirk Heirbaut (eds), The
Laws’ Many Bodies, c1600–1900 (Duncker & Humblot, 2015) 193–222.
4See e.g. Rafael D García Pérez, ‘Derechos forales y Codiﬁcación civil en España (1808–
1880)’ (2012) 82 Anuario de Historia del Derecho Español 149; Bartolomé Clavero, ‘La
gran diﬁcultad. Frustración de una ciencia del derecho en la España del siglo XIX’
(1984) 12 Ius Commune 91.
5See Aniceto Masferrer (ed), La Codiﬁcación española. Una aproximación doctrinal e his-
toriográﬁca a sus inﬂuencias extranjeras, y a la francesa en particular (Aranzadi–
Thomson Reuters, 2014).
6PArregui, ‘Intercambios codiﬁcadores entre ambos lados del Atlántico’ (2012) 82 Anuario
de Historia del Derecho Español 337.
7See e.g. Rafael Gibert, ‘La codiﬁcación civil en España (1752–1889)’ in La formazione
storica del diritto moderno in Europa. Atti del terzo congreso internazionale della
Società italiana di Storia del Diritto (Olschki Ed., 1977) II; on the García Goyena
Project, see M Reparaz Padrós, ‘García Goyena: biografía de un jurista liberal (Una aporta-
ción al estudio de la codiﬁcación civil española)’ (1996) 66 Anuario de Historia del
Derecho Español 689.
8On this matter, see A Guzmán Brito, ‘La inﬂuencia del Código civil francés en las codiﬁ-
caciones americanas’ in De la codiﬁcación a la descodiﬁcación. Code civil (1804–2004).
Código de Bello (1885–2005) (Santiago de Chile, 2005) 27–60; A Guzmán Brito, Historia
de la codiﬁcación civil en Iberoamérica (Pamplona, 2006); Carlos A Ramos Núñez, El
Código napoleónico y su recepción en América Latina (Pontiﬁcia Universidad Católica
del Perú, 1997); more recently, see Agustin Parise, ‘Importing Manufacture from the
Low Countries: The Use of the Dutch Civil Code (1838) in the Drafting of the Argentine
Civil Code (1871)’ in Dave de Ruysscher and others (eds), Rechtsgeschiedenis op
nieuwe wegen: Legal History, Moving In New Directions (Maklu, 2015) 331–54 (noting
the relevance of García Goyena Concordances – Concordancias, motivos y comentarios
del Código civil español, 4 vols, Madrid 1852 – as a useful tool to spread the inﬂuence
of some civil codes, e.g. the Dutch Civil Code over the Argentine one).
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perspective, and on other particularities like the sources of law. For example, the
fact that the Napoleonic code did not recognise explicitly custom as a legal source
whereas the Spanish code did. Despite this, some non-Spanish comparative
lawyers paid heed to this fact.9
This negligence is probably due to the fact that, until recently, Spanish legal
historians have not paid much attention to the dichotomy between tradition and
foreign inﬂuences in the codiﬁcation movement.10 Furthermore, the French inﬂu-
ence over the Spanish codiﬁcation was taken for granted without sufﬁciently
exploring its particular extent or scope. This way of looking at the Spanish codi-
ﬁcation by some scholars is related to the debate as to whether the codiﬁcation
brought with it the nationalisation or the denationalisation of law.
Some scholars have presented codiﬁcation as a means to both nationalise and
denationalise European legal traditions. This seems to be a paradox. On the one
hand, the fact that laws needed to be approved by national parliaments and the
ius commune – which was somehow regarded as a foreign law – ceased to be in
force, shows how much codiﬁcation contributed to the nationalisation of law.
On the other hand, the fact that national parliaments enacted codes the content
of which had been highly inﬂuenced by foreign codes reveals that codiﬁcation
also contributed to the denationalisation of law. Different perspectives and argu-
ments may lead to completely opposite outcomes. This debate has been particu-
larly present in the Spanish scholarship. In the end, it seems that the view of
codiﬁcation as a means of denationalisation of law has prevailed, giving either a
biased and partisan view of codiﬁcation, or simplifying its richness. The conse-
quences of such an approach have been notable in describing the codiﬁcation of
all legal branches, particularly in the civil law domain.
It is undeniable that drafters of the Spanish civil code had in mind and used the
French and other foreign models, but the ﬁnal outcome was quite unique in many
aspects. Can this uniqueness be compared? Yes, it can be compared, but it should
neither be dismissed nor overlooked. Otherwise, national and legal identity would
be disregarded and mistreated. A comparative analysis of codiﬁcation with rigid
models which prevent the integration of the peculiarities of legal traditions can
be notably misleading. Making comparisons with a stereotyped ideal or model
of code would prevent us from reﬂecting on the particularities of different legal
identities. The codiﬁcation movement cannot be accurately studied by comparing
codes with just one or two models. The outcome would excessively simplify
reality. Reality shows that codiﬁcation is a diverse and complex process which
resembles a challenging mosaic made up of many different codes.
9See e.g. MA Glendon, PG Carozza and CB Picker, Comparative Legal Traditions. Texts,
Materials, and Cases on Western Law (Thomson/West, 2007) 241: ‘In the civil law theory
of sources of law, custom is regularly listed as a primary source, but routinely dismissed as
of slight practical importance, except in Spain and some of the other Spanish-speaking
countries.’
10See Masferrer, La Codiﬁcación española (n 5).
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This issue certainly deserves attention, which – from my point of view –
has not been given until recently. The present article aims to contribute to
this scholarly cause. It only consists of a starting point. If this work manages
to stimulate the spirit of jurists and legal historians who decide to study the
speciﬁc scope of foreign inﬂuences – and therefore the actual weight of tra-
dition – in legal institutions set out in our Codes, then the effort will have
been worthwhile.
After the Introduction (I), the present article will explore the Spanish historio-
graphy on this matter in a European context, paying particular attention to
Belgium and Romania (II). It will then provide some examples of the view of
the Spanish civil code (1889) as a supposed denationalisation of law, namely
the validity of extra-legal sources of law in the Spanish codiﬁcation (III). I will
ﬁnish with some concluding considerations (IV).
II. Codiﬁcation as nationalisation or denationalisation of law: an
overview of the Spanish historiography in the European context
The shift in the law from the eighteenth to the nineteenth centuries constitutes one
of the most complex periods to understand and describe, both in Spain and
throughout the West. The revolutions in North America (1776) and France
(1789) led to the emergence of a new political framework, the liberal or consti-
tutional, which promoted a juridical transformation, a renewal of the law which,
according to some scholars, meant a rupture with the then existing one.
1. Spain
In Spain it is quite widely believed that both the Codiﬁcation movement and the
codiﬁcation of the different branches of the law were primarily derived from the
French model, as well as from other foreign Codes that our Codes’ drafters had
at their disposal when preparing the texts that would be sent to the legislature
for discussion and, where appropriate, approval.
Such an idea clearly appears in the textbook entitledHistory of Spanish Law (I.
Origin and evolution of the law), by Alfonso García-Gallo, who, after dealing with
‘the fullness of national law’ (Modern Age, 1474–1808) – in which period barely
existed the concept of the ‘nation’ – deﬁnes or characterizes the contemporary
period as ‘the denationalization of the Spanish law’ (since 1808). Such denationa-
lisation was not only the result of ‘cultural denationalization’, but mainly of the
‘imitation of the foreign law’:
The innovations that were introduced or attempted to introduce in the existing law,
did not involve the more or less radical reform thereof; but its replacement by a new
one. This, among the most exalted, was a purely rational creation based on the doc-
trinal lucubrations of the French philosophers of the 18th century, or in the systems of
certain foreign thinkers of the 19th century. However, innovators usually tried to
imitate and copy – rather than to seek inspiration or formation – the law of those
countries that they believed to be ahead of progress. During the 19th century,
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French law was the preferred model by everyone in its diverse aspects. To a lesser
extent, and especially in criminal matters, Italian law was resorted to also; and in
a certain political aspect, the English one was also referred to. Later on, in the
20th century, a radical change of direction was conducted, abandoning the previous
models in order to ﬁnd new inspirations in German law. Finally, under the Second
Republic, extremists tried to imitate in some aspects the Russian Communist law.
With all of this, Roman law, which throughout the decades had been a source of
inspiration for jurists, managed to lose the interest of these jurists, and its develop-
ment fell in Spain in the most prostration.11
This general characterisation of the nineteenth-century Spanish legal system as
‘denationalisation’ did not prevent him from recognising that
the civil code project of 1851 sought to introduce multiple changes, turning away
from traditional law and following the French one and others; hence the reason
why it was rejected. On the other hand, the code of 1888–1889 remained faithful
to the ancient law, at least in the essential.12
Meanwhile, Galo Sánchez characterised the same period with the opposite
expression, ‘national law’, highlighting ‘the national nature of the laws, given
now for the whole Spanish nation’, while acknowledging that ‘the inﬂuence of
French law is not only seen regarding the legal content, but also in the technique
of legislation and in the characteristics that it presents with regard to the scope of
its application and its centralist spirit’.13 The ‘nationalisation’ of the law also
meant the end of the validity of a supranational law which was in force throughout
the European Continent, the ius commune. With the promulgation of codes,
Roman canon-law deﬁnitively lost its binding force after more than six centuries
of an increased legal, doctrinal and jurisprudential role.14 Such ius commune of a
supranational origin did not seem compatible with a ‘national’ conception of law.
With the promulgation of codes, the liberal Cortes achieved that which the absol-
ute monarchs never could, that is, the ﬁnal suppression of the ius commune as a
normative and applicable source in the forensic practice. The stormy controversy
11A García-Gallo, Manual de Historia del Derecho español I. Origen y evolución del
Derecho (1984) 123; as will be seen, Galo Sánchez, in his Curso de Historia del
Derecho (1980), employed the expression ‘Derecho nacional’ when dealing with the nine-
teenth century (section VII, 175–80); a similar expression – though not identical – is used
by Aquilino Iglesia Ferreirós, La creación del Derecho. Una historia de la formación de un
derecho estatal español (1992) II ch 25 (‘La creación del Derecho en el Estado nacional’)
383–418.
12García-Gallo (n 11) 128.
13Sánchez (n 11) 175.
14On this matter, see, for example, Aniceto Masferrer and Juan A Obarrio, La formación del
Derecho foral valenciano. Contribución al estudio de las tradiciones jurídicas hispánicas
en el marco del ius commune (Dykinson, 2012).
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between the royal/national law and the ius commune of the Enlightenment was left
behind.15
Both García-Gallo and Sánchez were partially right, and their characterisations
are consistent with their diverse approaches. Nevertheless, characterising or
describing the evolution of the nineteenth-century law with the terms ‘nationalisa-
tion’ or ‘denationalisation’ fails to describe the richness and complexity of the his-
torical reality itself. And, in fact, neither the ‘nationalisation’ meant the end of the
inﬂuence of the ius commune, nor the ‘denationalisation’ necessarily implied
renouncing the existing legal tradition. In this sense, it should be noted that,
although codiﬁcation ended with the legal validity of the ius commune, it collected
much of that legacy in its precepts, largely contributing to its consecration and
consolidation. The codiﬁcation movement was the ﬁnal result of the scientiﬁc
treatment of some sources (Roman-canonical) which, although lacking in the
eighteenth century the prestige they had enjoyed previously, constituted the
basis upon which the new building was built, whose scaffold (notions, categories
and principles) was less innovative than the historiography has sometimes
suggested.16 In this vein, even though I accept the term ‘nationalisation’ to refer
to the fact that the validity of law could only derive from its approval by the
whole nation, represented in Parliament, and that, as a consequence, the ius
commune lost its legal validity or binding force, it would be unwise, nevertheless,
to overlook the fact that the Codes, inasmuch as they consecrated the notions, cat-
egories and principles of the tradition of the ius commune, were of a ‘suprana-
tional’ ﬂavour, and, at the same time – once integrated in the tradition of the ius
proprium – took the guise of ‘national’ law.
It would be pointless, therefore, to hold that any inﬂuence or element arising
from foreign models represented a ‘denationalisation’ of the law. We should
examine in each case whether an alleged foreign inﬂuence could come from the
15On this matter, see Ramon Riaza, ‘El Derecho romano y el Derecho nacional en Castilla
durante el siglo XVIII’ (1929) 12 Revista de Ciencias Jurídicas y Sociales 104; A Álvarez
de Morales, La Ilustración y la reforma de la Universidad en la España del siglo XVIII
(Madrid, 1971); Mariano Peset and José Luis Peset, La Universidad española (siglos
XVIII-XIX). Despotismo ilustrado y Renovación liberal (Madrid, 1974); Mariano Peset,
‘Derecho romano y Derecho real en las Universidades del siglo XVIII’ (1975) 45
Anuario de Historia del Derecho Español 273; for an overview, see Santos M Coronas
González, ‘La literatura jurídica española del siglo XVIII’ in J Alvarado (ed), Historia
de la literatura jurídica en la España del Antiguo Régimen (Madrid, 2000) 527–74; and
‘El pensamiento jurídico de la Ilustración en España’ in Tomás de Montagut (ed), Història
del pensament jurídic (Universitat Pompeu Fabra, 1999).
16On this matter, see Aniceto Masferrer, Tradición y reformismo en la Codiﬁcación penal
española. (Universidad de Jaén, 2003); Aniceto Masferrer, ‘La ciencia del Derecho penal en
la Codiﬁcación decimonónica. Una aproximación panorámica a su contenido y rasgos fun-
damentales’ in Estudios de Historia de las ciencias criminales en España (Dykinson, 2007)
273–349; Aniceto Masferrer, ‘Codiﬁcation of Spanish Criminal Law in the Nineteenth
Century: A Comparative Legal History Approach’ (2009) 4(1) Journal of Comparative
Law 96.
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doctrinal development of categories and principles of the ius commune, integrated
in the tradition of ius proprium of several Spanish territories, rather than from a
real transplant or adoption of an institution outside the peninsular tradition
itself. In this regard, it should be examined to what extent, and despite the simi-
larity of the articles concerning obligations and contracts between the French
and Spanish civil code (and Italian, among others), these precepts did not imply
much of a ‘denationalisation’ of the Spanish law as a consecration of a Spanish
legal centuries-old tradition, thanks to the scholarly contributions of the French
jurists Jean Domat (1625–96),17 Henri François D’Aguesseau (1668–1751)18
and Robert-Joseph Pothier (1699–1772).19
Describing the nineteenth-century law as ‘nationalisation’ or ‘denationalisa-
tion’ whilst forgetting the fact that codes were the ﬁnal result of a supranational
legal science, and that they consecrated notions, categories, principles and insti-
tutions whose validity was supranational and, at the same time – once integrated
in the iura propria – autochthonous or national, constitutes an erroneous and
ambiguous interpretation of the reality. Only the recognition of the close connec-
tion between codes and the ius-commune science makes sense of the terms ‘natio-
nalisation’ and ‘denationalisation’ in this context, granting them their true scope
and meaning, while qualifying and relativising their most literal sense.20
Perhaps it is precisely the poor and limited Spanish legal science of the eight-
eenth century which has contributed both to the overlooking of the close connection
between codes and the tradition itself (including both the ius commune and iura
propria), and to the overestimation of foreignmodels’ inﬂuence in the Spanish codi-
ﬁcation process. Indeed, the Spanish legal science of the eighteenth century – and
part of the nineteenth –was so poor that – asGarcía-Gallo so eloquently stated – ‘the
new literature completely broke away from the tradition’.21 Such ‘detachment’
between the new doctrine and tradition, reﬂecting the Spanish literature of the
17Jean Domat, Les lois civiles dans leur ordre natural, 3 vols (1689–1694).
18Henri F d’Aguesseau, Oeuvres complètes du chancelier d’Aguesseau, 13 vols (1759–
1789); Jean M Pardessus edited a revised version in 16 volumes (1819).
19Robert Joseph Pothier, Pandectae Iustinianeae in novum ordinem digestae, 3 vols (1748–
1752); Robert Joseph Pothier Traité des obligations, 2 vols (1761–64).
20In this regard, I could not agree more with Juan Baró Pazos, who concluded, in his book
chapter ‘La inﬂuencia del Código civil francés (1804) en el Código civil español (1889)’ in
Masferrer, La Codiﬁcación española (n 5) 114–17, that the inﬂuence of Code civil over the
Spanish one was due to its Romanist character, because both states shared the same ius
commune tradition; for the opposite view, see Manuel J Peláez Albendea, ‘Le Code de
1804, le Code civil espagnol de 1889 et le principe de la liberté (Réception particulière a
l’Espagne)’ in Jean-Luc Chabot, Jean L, P Didier and J Ferrand (eds), Le Code civil et les
droits de l’homme. Actes du Colloque international de Grenoble (L’Harmattan, 2005) 309–
17; according to his opinion, the inﬂuence of the Digest or Partidas has been exaggerated:
‘la rédaction de quelques-uns des articles duCode civil spagnol, dont on considère qu’elle
provient du Digeste ou des Partidas (qui à 70% sont du droit romain), a été, en réalité, extraite
du Code napoléonien, en adoptant le critère ou la solution romaniste’ (310, 311, 315).
21García-Gallo (n 11) 129.
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eighteenth and nineteenth centuries – unlike the French, German or Italian one – has
not only made it difﬁcult to appreciate the inﬂuence that tradition had in the new
codiﬁed law, but has also provided, as a logical consequence, a rather generic,
topical and gloomy picture regarding the true extent of foreign inﬂuences in the
different Spanish codes. Likewise, later historiography has hardly addressed this
issue, simply repeating and reiterating – sometimes even literally – statements
made by some of the greatest commentators of the nineteenth century.
In this regard, textbooks explicitly state that the Codiﬁcation movement was a
European phenomenon22 which would later spread into Latin America, just as the
Spanish legal tradition in previous centuries had been distinctively European, thus
enabling andpossibly requiring the legal historian to apply a comparative approach.23
Within Europe, handbooks highlight how the success of the French Revolution, and
especially the promulgation of Napoleonic codes, erected the French law, that is, its
Constitutions and Codes, in a model for other European countries.
That the idea of a modern liberal code was identiﬁed with France, and that
French codes turned out to be the model for many European countries, is not a
matter of dispute. The fact that this affected Spain is also indisputable. Spanish
handbooks give clear evidence of this fact, highlighting in particular the role of
the Code civil (1804).24 Even though the Napoleonic civil code was not the
only one approved – since it was followed by the criminal, commercial and pro-
cedural ones (civil and criminal) – ‘none, however, had such importance and
quality as the Code civil, whose inﬂuence throughout continental Europe and
later through several American countries was vast and lasting’.25 In such a way,
22Francisco Tomás y Valiente, Manual de Historia del Derecho Español (Tecnos, 1995)
468; José Antonio Escudero, Curso de Historia del Derecho. Fuentes e instituciones polí-
tico-administrativas (2003) 888; José Antonio Alejandre García, Temas de Historia del
Derecho: Derecho del constitucionalismo y codiﬁcación (1978) 110; Tomás de Montagut
Estragués and Carlos J Maluquer, Història del dret español (Edicions de Universitat
Oberta de Catalunya, 1997) 233; Jesús Lalinde Abadía, Iniciación histórica al Derecho
español (1970) 241; Galo Sánchez, Curso de Historia del Derecho (Instituto Editorial
Reus, 1960) 175; Josep Mª Font Rius, Apuntes de Historia del Derecho español
(tomadas de las explicaciones ordinarias de la Cátedra) (1969) 326, 340; Mariano
Peset, Lecciones de Historia del Derecho (2000) ch. 24 (‘Codiﬁcación liberal’); Mariano
Peset, Historia de las Constituciones y los Códigos (1997); Santos M Coronas González,
Manual de Historia del Derecho español (1996) 420–22; Aniceto Masferrer, Spanish
Legal Traditions: A Comparative Legal History Outline (Dykinson, 2012) 317.
23On this matter, see Aniceto Masferrer, ‘Spanish Legal History: A Need for its Compara-
tive Approach’ in Kjell Å Modéer and Per Nilsén (eds), How to Teach European Compara-
tive Legal History (Workshop, Faculty of Law, Lund University, 19–20 August 2009)
(Juristförlaget, 2011) 107–42.
24See, for example, Jesús Lalinde Abadía,Derecho Histórico Español (Juristförlaget, 1974)
100; Tomás y Valiente (n 22) 478–81; Escudero (n 22) 888–89; De Montagut Estragués and
Maluquer (n 22) 234–35; Peset, Lecciones de Historia (n 22) 339–41; Peset, Historia de las
Constituciones (n 22) 66–69.
25Tomás y Valiente (n 22) 480.
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Escudero and Peset synthesise the important role of the Code civil as a model in
the European Codiﬁcation movement in general and in Spain in particular:
The high scholarly proﬁle of this legal body and reﬁned literary concepts… explain
the rapid spread of the Codiﬁcation process both in France and Europe. There, the
promulgation of the Code de Commerce, the Code de procedure and the Code
Pénal, turned in a few years’ time that country into the leader of the new bourgeois
codiﬁcation in the world. The Code civilwas the main and sometimes literal model of
those made by other countries during the 19th century.26
The French and German codes are the most remarkable of the European codiﬁcation.
Both are an example for many, for different nations; they represent two versions of
the treatment that Civil law and property in the new Europe would receive. The inﬂu-
ence of the French one over projects and the Spanish civil code is noticeable.27
Napoleonic codes thus became the model with which modern liberal codiﬁca-
tion was initiated in Europe in the early nineteenth century, as Clavero has high-
lighted with the following terms:
France even provided us with a textual model…At this stage, regarding its most
speciﬁc content, what was understood by codes was the idea of more tangible
texts. Those promulgated in France by Napoleon were understood in this way. It
did not simply involve, under the Constitution of 1808, their translation and prep-
aration for their promulgation in Spain, although this was not accomplished. It
may also be the case that another idea of Code, having existed in France itself,
was not considered. The codiﬁcation program had actually emerged in the French
revolution as a precise requirement of the declaration or recognition of rights,
mainly individual ones, and the corresponding demand for the abolition of all
kinds of estate orders and privileges, as well as traditional corporations.28
In describing the Spanish case, handbooks make reference to the French inﬂu-
ence in the various codiﬁcations, with particular emphasis on the Civil and Com-
mercial versions. Regarding Civil codiﬁcation, there are explicit references to the
French inﬂuence in the Projects of 1821,29 1832,30 1851,31 as well as – by means
26Escudero (n 22) 889.
27Peset, Lecciones deHistoria (n 22) 339; see also Peset,Historia de las Constituciones (n 22)
66.
28Bartolomé Clavero, Manual de Historia Constitucional de España (Alianza Editorial,
1989) 22.
29Tomás y Valiente (n 22) 539; Escudero (n 22) 905; Enrique Gacto Fernández, Juan A Ale-
jandre García and José Mª García Marín, Manual básico de Historia del derecho (temas y
antología de textos) (Alianza Editorial, 2005) 424; José Sánchez Arcilla, Historia del
Derecho I. instituciones político-administrativas (Dykinson, 1995) 987; Peset, Lecciones
de Historia (n 22) 340; Peset, Historia de las Constituciones (n 22) 84; Coronas González
(n 22) 472.
30Font Rius (n 22) 359; Coronas González (n 22) 472.
31Lalinde Abadía, Derecho histórico español (n 24) 101; Lalinde Abadía, Iniciación histór-
ica (n 22) 241; Font Rius (n 22) 360; Tomás y Valiente (n 22) 550; Gacto Fernández,
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of the latter one – the civil code of 1888/89.32 Along with Civil codiﬁcation, com-
mercial codiﬁcation was – according to handbooks, apparently reﬂecting the
course of historiography – where the French inﬂuence was signiﬁcantly more
noticeable, especially in the Code of 182933 (the basis for the Code of 1885),
albeit ‘still taking into account Castilian law’34 as well as ‘traditional Mediterra-
nean maritime law’.35
Regarding Criminal codiﬁcation, reference is made to the inﬂuences when
dealing with the Codes of 1822 and 1848. Concerning the ﬁrst one, handbooks
echo – if not textually reproduce – Joaquín Francisco Pacheco’s well-known state-
ment, which sought to show that the Spanish code had ‘some of the Fuero Juzgo
and the Partidas, wrapped with the Napoleonic code’s character’.36 As regards the
Code of 1848, it had been often noted that the French inﬂuence came about
through the Brazilian Code of 1830, which served as the main model for drafters.37
Recent historiography has shown that the inﬂuence of the Napoleonic criminal
code radically decreased after the promulgation of the criminal Code of Brazil
(1830), whose main drafter – called Bernardo Pereira de Vasconcelos – drew
much more heavily upon the Austrian criminal code (1803) than the French one
(1810).38 According to this view, the French model was overcome by the
Alejandre García and García Marín (n 29) 426; Sánchez Arcilla (n 29) 987; Peset, Lecciones
de Historia (n 22) 351; Peset, Historia de las Constituciones (n 22) 85–86; Coronas Gon-
zález (n 22) 472–73.
32Lalinde Abadía, Derecho histórico español (n 24) 102; Lalinde Abadía, Iniciación histór-
ica (n 22) 242; Font Rius (n 22) 361; Tomás y Valiente (n 22) 550; Escudero (n 22) 907;
Gacto Fernández, Alejandre García and García Marín (n 29) 436; Peset, Lecciones de His-
toria (n 22) 357; Peset, Historia de las Constituciones (n 22) 92; Coronas González (n 22)
475.
33Lalinde Abadía, Derecho histórico español (n 24) 102; Lalinde Abadía, Iniciación histór-
ica (n 22) 243; Font Rius (n 22) 358; Tomás y Valiente (n 22) 508; Escudero (n 22) 899;
Gacto Fernández, Alejandre García and García Marín (n 29) 405; Peset, Lecciones de His-
toria (n 22) 341; Sánchez Arcilla (n 29) 979; Coronas González (n 22) 467; De Montagut
Estragués and Maluquer (n 22) 237.
34Lalinde Abadía, Derecho histórico español (n 24) 102; Lalinde Abadía, Iniciación histór-
ica (n 22) 243.
35Font Rius (n 22) 358.
36Joaquín Francisco Pacheco, Código penal concordado y comentado (Madrid, 1856) I 54;
see e.g. Lalinde Abadía, Derecho histórico español (n 24) 103; Lalinde Abadía, Iniciación
histórica (n 22) 243; Font Rius (n 22) 356; Tomás y Valiente (n 22) 497; Escudero (n 22)
894; Sánchez Arcilla (n 29) 974; Peset, Lecciones de Historia (n 22) 350; Peset, Historia de
las Constituciones (n 22) 95; Iglesia Ferreirós (n 11) 477; Coronas González (n 22) 464.
37See, for example, Lalinde Abadía, Derecho histórico español (n 24) 103; Lalinde Abadía,
Iniciación histórica (n 22) 244; Tomás y Valiente (n 22) 499; Escudero (n 22) 895; Sánchez
Arcilla (n 29) 976; Gacto Fernández, Alejandre García and García Marín (n 29) 398–99;
Peset, Historia de las Constituciones (n 22) 95–96; Coronas González (n 22) 465.
38On this matter, see Bernardino Bravo Lira, ‘Fortuna del Código penal español de 1848.
Historia en cuatro actos y tres Continentes: de Mello Freire y Zeiller a Vasconcelos y
Seijas Lozano’ (2004) 74 Anuario de Historia del Derecho Español 23, esp 40ff;
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superiority of the rational constructions of the Central European ones.39 A code is
never a pure national product.40
Finally, it should be added that Spanish legal history handbooks hardly include
anything on the inﬂuence of Procedural codes41 and mortgage law, which does not
reﬂect the rigorous studies of the Spanish historiography on these areas.42
Upon accepting the premise concerning the inﬂuence that the Napoleonic legal
work had as a ‘model code’ throughout Europe in general and Spain in particular,
the scope of that particular inﬂuence should be considered, together with inﬂu-
ences emanating from other Codes (European and American). In addition, the
weight of the tradition in the elaboration and ﬁnal approval of the various codes
should be carefully analysed. In this vein, dealing with the Spanish civil code,
some authors refer to the inﬂuence of the tradition of ‘Castilian law’ or ‘not
failing to take into account Castilian law’,43 to having ‘largely respected Castilian
law’,44 to the ‘scientiﬁc commitment between old Castilian law and the advances
of the French code’,45 to ‘few doses of Castilian law’,46 to the ‘elements of Cas-
tilian law’,47 to ‘Codiﬁcation not being a foreign transcript, but dealing with tra-
ditional Spanish law’48 etc.
This issue, that is, the speciﬁc scope of the several foreign inﬂuences – and not
just the French one – and the weight of tradition itself in Codiﬁcation, certainly
requires a further study. The starting point of which should be a thorough analysis
of historiography and doctrinal sources.
Bernardino Bravo Lira, ‘Bicentenario del Código penal de Austria. Su proyección desde el
Danubio a Filipinas’ (2004) 26 Revista de Estudios Histórico-Jurídicos de Valparaíso 140.
39Bravo Lira, ‘Fortuna del Código penal’ (n 38) 57. There the author resorts to the thesis of
André-Jean Arnaud, Origines doctrinelles du code civil francais (Paris, 1969): ‘Francia no
estaba preparada en su conjunto para las construcciones racionalistas que gozaban de gran
favor en Europa central. Los juristas franceses seguían adheridos al viejo plan tripartito de
las Instituciones, con las antedichas aproximaciones al espíritu moderno. Otro tanto
hicieron los codiﬁcadores.’
40Bravo Lira, ‘Fortuna del Código penal’ (n 38) 24.
41On the French inﬂuence over criminal procedure (Ley de Enjuiciamiento Criminal, in
force from 1872 to 1879), see Lalinde Abadía, Derecho histórico español (n 24) 103;
Lalinde Abadía, Iniciación histórica (n 22) 245.
42Margarita Serna Vallejo, La publicidad inmobiliaria en el derecho hipotecario histórico
español (Madrid, 1996); concerning the codiﬁcation of civil and criminal procedure, see
Enrique Álvarez Cora, La arquitectura de la justicia burguesa. Una introducción al enjui-
ciamiento civil en el siglo XIX (Madrid, 2002); Paz Alonso Romero, Orden procesal y gar-
antías entre Antiguo Régimen y constitucionalismo gaditano (Madrid, 2008); Isabel Ramos
Vázquez, ‘La Comisión de Justicia y el Proyecto de Reglamento para las causas criminales
de 1811’ (2009) 5 Revista de Sociales y Jurídicas supp 92.
43Lalinde Abadía, Derecho histórico español (n 24) 102.
44Lalinde Abadía, Iniciación histórica (n 22) 242.
45Escudero (n 22) 907.
46Peset, Lecciones de Historia (n 22) 357; Peset, Historia de las Constituciones (n 22) 92.
47Peset, Historia de las Constituciones (n 22) 85.
48Lalinde Abadía, Iniciación histórica (n 22) 240.
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As is well known, Napoleonic codiﬁcation constituted the ﬁrst triumph of the
modern codiﬁcation technique. Indeed, within a few years, Napoleon managed to
promulgate almost all of French law (Civil code, 1804; Civil procedure code,
1806; Commercial code, 1807; Criminal procedure code, 1808; Criminal code,
1810), and its codes set themselves as the ﬁrst and foremost model of the European
continental tradition.
While some countries opted – either on grounds of conquest (or political
domain) or by mere persuasion – for the full adoption of the Napoleonic codes,
others, such as Spain – as well as the Netherlands, Italy, Romania and Portugal
– drafted their Codes drawing on them to a greater or lesser extent.49
While the total or partial literal adoption of a Code is readily detectable, the
analysis of the speciﬁc scope of a Code’s inspiration (French) over another
(Spanish) is not so easy to discern. In any case, Spanish historiography, perhaps
following the disregard shown by the legal literature of the nineteenth century,
has not addressed this issue, but has instead contributed to the general consensus
that the Spanish codiﬁcation movement is largely (albeit not exclusively) indebted
to the French model.
It is true that, in recent years, works starting to pay attention to the French
inﬂuence in the Spanish codiﬁcation of civil law have been published.50 More-
over, previous works on the codiﬁcation of particular civil-law institutions
might be helpful in ascertaining the scope of the French and other foreign inﬂu-
ences over the Spanish civil code. In fact, rigorous works on the codiﬁcation of
family law51 – including the dowry,52 contracts53 and successions54 – led a
legal historian to state that the Spanish civil code was considerably indebted to
49On the territorial expansion of the French civil code through conquest, persuasion or
inspiration, see J Limpens, ‘Territorial Expansion of the Code’ in Bernard Schwartz (ed),
The Code of Napoleon and the Common-Law World (New York University Press, 1956,
The Lawbook Exchange, 1998) 92–109.
50For a general overview, see Baró Pazos (n 20) 53–128; see also Carlos Petit, ‘España y el
Code Napoleon’ in (2008) 41:4 Anuario de Derecho Civil 1774–1840; Peláez Albendea (n
20) 309–17.
51Manuel A Bermejo Castrillo, Entre Ordenamientos y Códigos. Legislación y doctrina
sobre familia a partir de las Leyes de Toro (Madrid, 2009); Enrique Gacto, ‘Sobre el
modelo jurídico del grupo familiar en el siglo XIX’ (1998) 25 Historia. Instituciones. Doc-
umentos 219.
52J García Martín, Costumbre y ﬁscalidad de la dote. Las Leyes de Toro, entre Derecho
Común, Germánico y Ius Commune (Madrid, 2004).
53On this matter, see the works by Enrique Álvarez Cora, La teoría de los contratos en Cas-
tilla (siglos XIII–XVIII) (Madrid, 2005); La codiﬁcación de los contratos de compraventa y
permuta (Madrid, 2008).
54Francisco L Pacheco Caballero, ‘Derecho histórico y Codiﬁcación. El derecho sucesorio’
(2012) 82 Anuario de Historia del Derecho Español 134; R Núñez Lagos, ‘El derecho suce-
sorio ante la tradición española y el Código civil’ (1951) 189 Revista general de legislación
y jurisprudencia 385.
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its own legal traditions.55 The regulation of property seems to have been particu-
larly inﬂuenced by the French model.56
Concerning the criminal law domain, in the last few years, scholars have
explored the French and other foreign inﬂuences over the Spanish Codiﬁcation.
Some works present a general overview of the French inﬂuence in the criminal-
law codiﬁcation in Spain,57 whereas others contain a historiographical
approach to foreign inﬂuences in speciﬁc criminal codes (particularly, those
of 182258 and 1848–185059). Some works went in depth in reconstructing
the particular extent of foreign inﬂuences in the codiﬁcation of particular crim-
inal law institutions.60 In doing so, the contribution of some exhaustive mono-
graphs on the criminal code of 1848–50 has been remarkable.61 All of these
scholarly works constitute a mere starting point of a line of research in pro-
gress.62 There is still much to be done.63 Despite this, obtained results are
55Baró Pazos (n 20) 95–102.
56This is the view of Mariano Peset in his works: ‘Acerca de la propiedad en el Code’
(1976) LII (515) Revista Crítica de Derecho Inmobiliario 879; ‘Derecho y propiedad en
la España liberal’ (1976–1977) I(5–6) Quaderni Fiorentini 463; Dos ensayos sobre la his-
toria de la propiedad de la tierra (Madrid, 1982); see also Bartolomé Clavero, ‘La propie-
dad considerada como capital, en los orígenes doctrinales del derecho actual español’
(1976–77) 5–6 Quaderni Fiorentini I 509; JL de los Mozos, ‘La formación del concepto
de propiedad que acoge el Código Civil’ (1992) 68 Revista Crítica de Derecho Inmobiliario
581; Jorge Correa Ballester, ‘La propiedad liberal en los manuales del derecho civil’ in Las
Universidades Hispánicas de la Monarquía de los Austrias al Centralismo Liberal (Sala-
manca, 2000) 91–110; more recently, Margarita Serna Vallejo, ‘Apuntes para la revisión
del concepto de propiedad liberal en España’ (2011) 81 Anuario de Historia del Derecho
Español 469–91.
57Aniceto Masferrer, ‘The Napoleonic Code pénal and the Codiﬁcation of Criminal Law in
Spain’ in Le Code penal. Les metamorphoses d’un modèle 1810–1820. Actes du colloque
international Lille/Gand 16–18 décembre 2012. Textes réunis et présentés par Chantal
Aboucaya et Renée Martinage (Centre d’Histoire Judiciaire, 2012) 65–98; Aniceto Masfer-
rer, ‘La Codiﬁcación española y sus inﬂuencias extranjeras. Una revisión en torno al alcance
del inﬂujo francés’ in Masferrer, La Codiﬁcación española (n 5) 19–43.
58Juan B Cañizares-Navarro, ‘El Código Penal de 1822: sus fuentes inspiradoras. Balance
historiográﬁco (desde el s XX)’ (2013) 10 GLOSSAE. European Journal of Legal History
108; Isabel Ramos Vázquez and Juan B Cañizares-Navarro, ‘La inﬂuencia francesa en la
primera Codiﬁcación española: el Código penal francés de 1810 y el Código penal
español de 1822’ in Masferrer, La Codiﬁcación española (n 5) 153–212; A Agüero and
M Lorente, ‘Penal enlightenment in Spain: from Beccaria’s reception to the ﬁrst criminal
code’ (2012) Forum Historiae Iuris, http://www.forhistiur.de/zitat/1211aguero-lorente.
htm (accessed 23 September 2016).
59Aniceto Masferrer and Mª Dolores del Mar Sánchez González, ‘Tradición e inﬂuencias
extranjeras en el Código penal de 1848. Aproximación a un mito historiográﬁco’ in Mas-
ferrer, La Codiﬁcación española (n 5) 213–74.
60See e.g. Isabel Ramos Vázquez, ‘La individualización judicial de la pena en la primera
codiﬁcación francesa y española’ (2014) 84 Anuario de Historia del Derecho Español 315.
61Emilia Iñesta Pastor, El Código penal de 1848 (Tirant lo blanc, 2010); Mª Dolores del Mar
Sánchez González, Los Códigos Penales de 1848 y 1850 (Madrid, 2004).
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already comparable to those of the criminal historiography of other European
jurisdictions like Italy64 and Germany.65
62Aniceto Masferrer (ed), La Codiﬁcación penal española. Contribución al estudio de sus
inﬂuencias extranjeras, y de la francesa en particular (Aranzadi–Thomson Reuters, forth-
coming 2017).
63‘The French Inﬂuence in the Western Criminal Law Codiﬁcation’ is the title of a research
project (in progress) in which several European and American legal scholars are involved.
Hopefully its ﬁrst results will come out soon: Aniceto Masferrer (ed), The Western Codiﬁ-
cation of Criminal Law: The Myth of its Predominant French Inﬂuence Revisited (Springer,
forthcoming 2017).
64A Cavanna, ‘Codiﬁcazione del diritto italiano e imperialismo giuridico francese nella
Milano napoleonica. Giuseppe Luosi e il diritto penale’ in Ius Mediolani. Studi di Storia
del diritto milanese offerti dagli allievi a Giulio Vismara (Milano, 1996) 659–760; A
Cavanna, La codiﬁcazione penale in Italia. Le origine lombade (Milano, 1975); M da
Passano, ‘La codiﬁcation du droit pénal dans l’Italie jacobine et napoleonienne’ in Revolu-
tions et justice en Europe. Modeles francais et traditions nationales (1780–1830) (L’Har-
mattan, 1999) 85–99; E Dezza, ‘Un critico milanese della codiﬁcazione penale
napoleonica. Pietro Mantegazza e le Osservazione criminaledel cessato Regno d’Italia
(1814)’ in Ius Mediolani. Studi di Storia del diritto milanese offerti dagli allievi a Giulio
Vismara (Milano, 1996) 909–77.
65Christian Brandt, Die Entstehung des Code pénal von 1810 und sein Einﬂuß auf die Straf-
gesetzgebung der deutschen Partikularstaaten des 19. Jahrhunderts am Beispiel Bayerns
und Preußens (Peter Lang, 2002); J Engelbrecht, ‘The French Model and German
Society: The Impact of the Code Penal on the Rhineland’ in Revolutions et justice en
Europe. Modeles francais et traditions nationales (1780–1830) (L’Harmattan, 1999)
101–107; E Feherenbach, Traditionale Gesellschaft und revolutionäres Recht: Die Einfüh-
rung des Code Napoleón in den Rheinbundestaaten (Göttingen, 3rd edn 1983); K Häfner,
Die Strafen des französischen Rechtes und ihr Vollzug, ein Grundriss (Gieβen, 1936); Karl
Härter, ‘Kontinuität und Reform der Strafjustiz zwischen Reichsverfassung und Rhein-
bund’ in Heinz Duchhardt und Andreas Kunz (eds), Reich oder Nation? Mitteleuropa
1780–1815 (Mainz, 1998) 219–78; Karl Härter, ‘Von der “Entstehung des öffentlichen Stra-
frechts” zur “Fabrikation des Verbrechens”. Neuere Forschungen zur Entwicklung von Kri-
minalität und Strafjustiz im früheneuzeitlichen Europa’ (2002) 1 Rechtsgeschichte.
Zeitschrift des Max Planck-Institut für europäische Rechtsgeschichte 159; F Hartmann,
Der Einﬂuß des französischen Rechts auf das Preußische Strafgesetzbuch von 1851 (Allge-
meiner Teil) (Göttingen, 1923); S Kleinbreuer, Das Rheinische Strafgesetzbuch. Das mate-
rielle Strafrecht und sein Einﬂuß auf die Strafgesetzgebung in Preußen und im
Norddeutschen Bund (Bonn, 1999); KJA Mittermaier, ‘Blicke auf den Zustand der Ausbil-
dung des Criminalrechts in Frankreich’ (1831) 3 Kritische Zeitschrift für Rechtswis-
senschaft und Gesetzgebung des Auslandes 414–43; KJA Mittermaier, ‘Über den neusten
Zustand der Gefängnisse in England und Frankreich’ (1820) 4, article nr. XXV, Neues
Archiv des Criminalrechts 571–95; EJ Paraquin,Die französische Gesetzgebung. Das Straf-
gesetzbuch, vol V (München, 1861); W Schubert, Französisches Recht in Deutschland zu
Beginn des 19. Jahrhunderts. Zivilrecht, Gerichtsverfassungsrecht und Zivilprozeßrecht
(Köln 1977); W Schubert, Der Code pénal des Königreichs Westphalen von 1813 mit
dem Code pénal von 1810 im Original und in deutscher Übersetzung (Peter Lang,
2001); L von Stein, Geschichte des französischen Strafrechts und des Prozesses (Basel,
1875; Aalen Verlag, 1968); K Volk, ‘Napoleon und das deutsche Strafrecht’ [1991] JuS
281ff.
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When analysing the extent of the French inﬂuence in the Spanish codiﬁcation
movement, it is necessary to distinguish three different levels: (1) the inspiration
arising out of the ‘modern idea of Code’, an area in which French codes enjoyed an
indisputable – and undisputed – authority up to the mid-nineteenth century; (2) the
‘formal (or structural) inﬂuence’, which could have been followed to a greater or
lesser extent by other European codes (including the Spanish one) and (3) a ‘sub-
stantive inﬂuence’ in the strictest sense, which allows the identiﬁcation of the
extent to which notions, principles and institutions from Spanish codes were
inspired by those of the French model, and whether they constituted an autochtho-
nous legacy (or French itself) or the product resulting from the development of
institutions coming from the ius commune, of a supranational scope, provided
with validity and integrated into the iura propria of several European territories.66
Often, the repeated and accepted cliché and commonplace – regarding the extent
of the French inﬂuence over the Spanish codiﬁcationmovement – has been based on
the opinion consigned by a commentator of a nineteenth-century Code, sometimes
without much of a scientiﬁc basis or offering a slightly reductionist view of the
French inﬂuence. Moreover, along with the references made to the French codiﬁca-
tion’s inﬂuence, studies should also render a timely account of other foreign inﬂu-
ences, in order to properly contextualise the French inﬂuxwithin the diverse foreign
inﬂuences. Otherwise, it would lack any rigour, for example, to talk about the
French inﬂuence of the Criminal code of 1848, without making reference to the
inﬂuence of the Brazilian Criminal code of 1830, despite it being true that the
French inﬂuence also arose through it. It is no way intended to deny nor reject
the Napoleonic codes’ inﬂuence in the Spanish codiﬁcation movement, but I do
think that its particular scope should be more accurately analysed. In fact, several
studies dealing with concrete legal and criminal institutions of the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries indicate that in Spain, the Frenchmodel exerted a smaller inﬂu-
ence than in other European countries such as Germany or Italy.67
Let us return to the province of civil law. In Spain, unlike other countries where
the Napoleonic Civil code was adopted for either military reasons – of conquest
(being imposed in part of Germany, Belgium, Luxemburg, Italy – Parma, Plasencia
and Guastalla – etc.) – or persuasive reasons (freely choosing to literally approve it
inWestphalia, Hanover, Baden,Warsaw, certain Swiss cantons, etc.), theCode civil
became just an inspiring source,68 as some countries did in Europe (Greece, 1827;
Netherlands, 1838; Italy, 1865; Romania, 1865; Portugal, 1867)69 and America
(Louisiana, 1808, 1825; Perú, 1852; Brasil: Esboço de Teixeira Freitas, 1859–67,
66Masferrer, ‘The Napoleonic Code pénal’ (n 57) 74–98.
67This is what I showed in my book entitled La inhabilitación y suspensión del ejercicio de
la función pública en la tradición penal europea y anglosajona. Especial consideración a
los Derechos francés, alemán, español, inglés y norteamericano (Servicio de Publicaciones
del Ministerio del Interior, 2009) (awarded the National Prize Victoria Kent 2008).
68Petit (n 50) 1801ff.
69See n 32.
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1916; Chile, 1855; Mexico: Estado de Oaxaca, 1827–29, 1852; Ecuador, 1858,
1860; Haiti, 1826; Bolivia: Code of Santa Cruz, 1830, 1845; Costa Rica, 1841;
Venezuela, 1867; Argentina; 1869),70 among other territories.71
To note that a Spanish code received ‘basic inspiration from the Napoleonic
code’,72 or that it presents ‘the cover of the…Napoleonic model’,73 are accurate
but very basic and generic statements – a characteristic of handbooks – and pro-
vides nothing on the speciﬁc scope of this inﬂuence. This requires detailed and rig-
orous analysis that historiography – with the abovementioned exceptions74 – has
hardly carried out.
Perhaps some time ago the claim stating that ‘it is not the duty of the historian, but
of the civil lawyer to analyse and assess the Code’s content’,75 could have been
accepted. The samecould be said regarding theCriminal,Commercial andProcedural
lawyer. But the truth is that after almost two centuries since the enactment of the ﬁrst
Spanish code (1822), it is not beneﬁcial to have hardly studied the extent of foreign
inﬂuences, as well as the weight of the autochthonous tradition. It is as if the idea
whereby Spanish codiﬁcation is indebted to the French one, regardless of the extent
to which this was so, was valid. The Spanish legal tradition is too rich, complex
and diverse to infer that the French inﬂuence simply standardised it. Despite it
being true that French and Spanish traditions may well have shared common traits
and elements, there is no doubt that they also present their own legal distinctiveness
as a consequence of their cultural, socio-economic and political diversity.
The Spanish civil code (1889) contained both elements from foreign codes
(French 1804,76 Italian 1865,77 Belgian,78 Portuguese,79 Mexican 1852,80
70Guzmán Brito, ‘La inﬂuencia’ (n 8) 27–60; see also Parise (n 8) 331–54.
71In the Near East, Africa, Eastern Asia, some states of NorthAmerica, Canada (Quebec), some
former French colonies (e.g. Haiti, 1816, 1825), Dominican Republic (1825), Japan, etc. On the
latter, see Jean-LouisHalpérin andNKanayama,Droit japonais et droit français aumiroirde la
modernité (Dalloz, 2007); Rafael Domingo Oslé, ‘Estudio preliminar’ in R Domingo and N
Hayashi, Código civil japonés (Madrid, 2000) 19–50, 19ff; see also Baró Pazos (n 20) 60–61.
72Font Rius (n 22) 361.
73Ibid, 356.
74See the references in n 50.
75Tomás y Valiente (n 22) 550.
76See the references at n 50.
77Juan Baró Pazos, La codiﬁcación del derecho civil en España (1808–1889) (Universidad
de Cantabria, 1993) 287.
78F Laurent, Principes de Droit civil (3rd edn, 33 vols, Brussels-Paris, 1869–78); P Salva-
dor Coderch and LlM Josep Santdiumenge, ‘La inﬂuencia del Avant-Projet de revisión du
Code civil belga de François Laurent en el Código civil español de 1889’ in Centenario del
Código civil. Asociación de profesores de derecho civil (Madrid, 1990) II 1927–65; on
Laurent and his project for a new civil code, see Dirk Heirbaut, ‘Een hopeloze zaak François
Laurents ontwerp van burgerlijk wetboek voor België’ in [2013] Pro Memorie 261.
79Carlos Petit, ‘España y el Código civil portuguez (1867)’ (2013) 66 Anuario de Derecho
Civil II 525.
80Baró Pazos (n 77) 289–90.
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Argentinean 1869,81 Chilean 1855,82 etc., as appropriate) and from its own tra-
dition. To unravel the tradition of the reform, as well as the autochthonous
legacy of the foreign, is an unavoidable task of the legal historian, and should
not be left to civil, commercial, procedural and criminal lawyers, unless they
are willing to study in depth legal transplants’ impact,83 or use the Kulturtransfer
or transferts culturels’ theory. This methodology emerged within the Franco-
German geographical context at the end of the last century in order to analyse
the ways through which foreign elements can be adopted in a determined
society, noting how they change in the course of the adoption process.84 Such
methodology is particularly useful when it comes to carrying out a comparative
study in a period which, as the French revolution and the Napoleonic stage, had
European or transnational effects. Although this theory, merged in the philological
and historical-cultural sphere, has been employed in order to study the aforemen-
tioned stage,85 there are already studies that show their usefulness in comparative
legal history.86
The supposed link between the civil-law codiﬁcation and nationalisation of
law needs to be carefully scrutinised in each jurisdiction.87 Whereas in some
countries their civil codes might reﬂect more or less faithfully their own legal tra-
dition, others regard their codes as foreign texts which are all but an expression of
their own legal tradition. In the European context, Belgium and Romania are
paramount.
81V Tau Anzoátegui, La codiﬁcación en la Argentina 1810–1870. Mentalidad social e ideas
jurídicas (Buenos Aires, 1977).
82A Guzmán Brito, Andrés Bello codiﬁcador. Historia de la ﬁjación y codiﬁcación del
derecho civil en Chile (Santiago, 1982).
83On this matter, see Alan Watson, Legal Transplants (Edinburgh, 1974; Athens GA, 1993,
2nd ed); for the opposite view, see Pierre Legrand, ‘The Impossibility of “Legal Trans-
plants”’ (1997) 4 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 111; Watson’s
answer to Pierre Legrand can be seen in A Watson, ‘Legal Transplants and European
Private Law’ (2000) 4(4) Electronic Journal of Comparative Law. www.ejcl.org/ejcl/44/
44-2.html
84M Espagne and M Werner, ‘Deutsch-französischer Kulturtransfer im 18 und 19 Jahrhun-
dert. Zu einem neuen interdiszipliären Forschungsprogramm des CNRS’ (1985) 13
Francia: Forschungen zur westeuropäischen Geschichte 502; M Espagne and M Werner,
‘La construction d’une référence culturelle allemande en France: genèse et histoire
(1750–1914)’ (1987) 42 Annales. Économies, Sociétés, Civilisations 969; Michel
Espagne, Les transferts culturels francoallemand (Presses Universitaires de France, 1999).
85See e.g. R Reichardt, ‘Die Französische Revolution als Maßstab des deutschen “Sonder-
weges”? Kleines Nachwort zu einer großen Debatte’ in Jürgen Voss (ed), Deutschland und
die Französische Revolution (München, 1983) 323–27.
86See, for example, Martijn van der Burg, ‘Cultural and Legal Transfer in Napoleonic
Europe: Codiﬁcation of Dutch Civil Law as a Cross-national Process’ (2015) 3(1) Com-
parative Legal History 85.
87See e.g. Heikki Pihlajamäki, ‘Private Law Codiﬁcation, Modernisation and Nationalism:
AView from Critical Legal History’ (2015) 1(2) Critical Analysis of Law 135.
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2. Belgium
Belgium is a relatively young country. It came into existence as an independent
state in 1830, when the Southern part of the then United Kingdom of the Nether-
lands seceded. From a legal perspective, before 1830, Southern Netherlands –
called Belgium after that year – went through different periods (Middle Ages,
Early Modern period – end of the ﬁfteenth century to 1795; French period –
1795 to 1815 and Dutch period –1815 to 1830).88 In the medieval period – as
Dirk Heirbaut states,
[i]t is hard to see how a “Belgian” legal tradition could have existed in the auton-
omous principalities. There was no political unity between them and, thus, no
uniﬁed law. Even within each of these principalities, there was no common legal
system. Medieval law in the Southern Netherlands was largely customary and
each place had its own customs and, thus, its own laws.89
Along with the variety of local customs, the presence of municipal legislation
and the reception of ius commune from the thirteen century onwards should also be
noted.90 In the early modern period political unity did not bring with it legal unity.
In 1795 the ‘French Period’ started, the Southern Netherlands was annexed to
France under Napoleon, resulting in the main legal consequence that all Napoleo-
nic codes and other reforms were introduced to the Southern Netherlands.91 After
the French occupation (1814), the Southern Netherlands entered into the newly-
created United Kingdom of the Netherlands (under William I of the House of
Orange), but this lasted only a few years, since in 1830 the South – more
French and practically oriented than the North – seceded.
After this brief description of the history of Belgium, one may ask whether
there was a Belgian legal tradition before Belgian independence in 1830. Accord-
ing to a leading Belgian scholar the answer is no.92 Interestingly enough, he gives
the same answer as to whether a Belgian legal tradition existed after Belgian inde-
pendence in 1830. He argues that after the Belgian Revolution –whose major legal
consequence was the approval of the Constitution (1831) – Belgium was not able
to get rid of the French inﬂuence. In others words, the political independence did
not lead to the making of a Belgian legal tradition. Heirbaut explains it as follows:
88Dirk Heirbaut, ‘The Belgian Legal Tradition: Does It Exist?’ in H Bocken, W De Bondt
and M Kruithof (eds), Introduction to Belgian law (Kluwer Law International, forthcoming
2016).
89Ibid.
90On this matter, see Dirk Heirbaut and Jean-François Gerkens, ‘In the Shadow of France:
Legal Acculturation and Legal Transplants in the Southern Netherlands/Belgium’ in E Dirix
and Y-L Leleu (eds), The Belgian Reports at the Congress of Washington of the Inter-
national Academy of Comparative Law (Bruylant, 2011) 3–34.
91Code civil, 1804; Judicial organisation, 1800; Code de procédure civile, 1806; Code de
commerce, 1807; Code d’Instruction criminelle, 1808; and Code pénal, 1810.
92Heirbaut (n 88).
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The result of this was that during most of the nineteenth century independence of the
legal system was further away than ever. The judicial organisation still ran along
Napoleonic lines. There were few changes to the French codes. Most attempts at
revising them failed.93
And later on, he concluded with a radical paragraph:
The country most faithful to Napoleon’s codes, or, a French province, these
expressions neatly sum up Belgium during the nineteenth century. Only a few
changes to the French codes were made. Even these changes should not be overes-
timated and be seen as the embryonic developments of a legal tradition of its own.
They were made only when necessary. Besides, some of them were not very
Belgian. Laurent was a native of Luxembourg, and many other more or less original
legal thinkers, like Haus were of German origin. It is hard to see how a Belgian legal
tradition could have come into existence with only French codes and foreign scholars
to nurture it. Paradoxically, throughout the nineteenth century Belgium’s highest
magistrates paid lip service to the country’s old legal traditions and its great jurists
of the past, as if to compensate for a reality which went completely against their
discourse.94
The current situation of the Belgian law does not seem to have changed much
regarding the making of a national legal culture. In fact, two regional legal cultures
have emerged, one in Flanders (the Dutch-speaking part of Belgium), and the other
in Wallonia (the French-speaking part of Belgium). And since ‘[d]ifferences will
only grow stronger in the future’, Heirbaut concluded his work as follows:
A Belgian legal tradition does not exist. Before the coming of the French, there were
mostly local and regional laws. Thereafter, Belgium had French laws. The weaken-
ing of French inﬂuence has not led to the development of a national legal culture, but
rather of two regional legal cultures, one in Flanders, and the other in the French-
speaking part of Belgium. Yet, there is one common element in the legal history
of Belgium: a pragmatic attitude toward law, which has, so far, enabled its jurists
and politicians to ﬁnd compromises in spite of the growing rift between Dutch-
and French-speaking Belgium.95
The Belgian case is particularly interesting. It is somehow unique. Its legal
system seems to be more French than Belgian and, therefore, more foreign than
national.96 Moreover, from 1830 a variety of social, political, cultural and religious
factors led Belgium to stick to the French system rather than building a supposed
national legal tradition. As has been said,
Belgian may be even more faithful to its French heritage than France itself. Its judi-
cial organisation is still closer to the Napoleonic model. In 2004, at the
93Ibid.
94Ibid.
95Ibid.
96On French inﬂuence in Belgium, see Heirbaut and Gerkens (n 90).
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commemoration of two hundred years since the enactment of the Civil Code,
Belgium had preserved more of the original articles than France.97
In Belgium, for example, despite the existence of a Dutch translation for the
Dutch-speaking part of the country,98 the ofﬁcial version of the Code civil is
still the 1807 Code Napoléon, whereas that is no longer true in France since
1807. Belgium somehow offered resistance during a ﬁrst generation to the new
French code,99 but French law eventually prevailed and still survives as one of
the main constituent parts of the Belgian legal system.100
Does this all mean that Belgium has no legal tradition or no ‘national’ legal
tradition? In my view, Belgium has indeed a legal tradition. I have no doubt
about it. Another question is whether this legal tradition might be labelled as
‘Belgian’ or as ‘national’. Since before 1830 the use of the expression Belgium
(instead of ‘Southern Netherlands’) would be anachronistic,101 and would not
have been an accurate representation. Nevertheless, this does not prevent one
from recognising that the legal tradition of the Southern Netherlands belongs to
the legal history of Belgium. In Spain, some scholars argued that a ‘Spanish
legal history’ course should only encompass the legal development from the
making of the Constitution of Cádiz (1812) onwards, because only in that
period did ‘Spain’ originate as a nation.102 Terms or expressions are relevant
97Ibid, 17.
98On this matter, see Dirk Heirbaut, ‘Introduction à l’édition cumulative du Code civil en
Belgique: sources et méthodologie’ in D Heirbaut and G Baeteman (eds), Cumulatieve
editie van het Burgerlijk Wetboek (Tijdschrift voor privaatrecht, 2004) lxxxiii-cxix; Dirk
Heirbaut, ‘Editing and Translating the Code Civil in Belgium’ (2004) 72 Tijdschrift voor
rechtsgeschiedenis 215.
99Dirk Heirbaut, ‘Conclusions: Codiﬁcation: A New Beginning for the Nation: The
Relationship of the Code Civil to the Old Law and to Nationalism’ in R Beauthier, Le
Code Napoléon, un ancêtre vénéré? (Bruylant, 2004) 319–33.
100On the survival of French law in Belgium, see the works of Dirk Heirbaut, ‘L’émancipa-
tion tardive d’une pupille de la nation française. L’histoire du droit belge aux 19ème et
20ème siècles’ in AWijffels, Le Code civil entre ius commune et droit civil européen (Bruy-
lant, 2005) 611–42; Dirk Heirbaut and Matthias E Storme, ‘The Belgian Legal Tradition:
From a Long Quest For Legal Independence to a Longing For Independence’ in E Dirix
and Y-H Leleu, The Belgian Reports at the Congress of Utrecht of the International
Academy of Comparative Law (Bruylant, 2006) 3–43; Dirk Heirbaut, ‘Cowardice as a
Virtue: A History of the Policies of the Belgian Justice Ministers since 1830’ in B Diestelk-
amp and others (eds), Liber amicorum Kjell Å Modéer (Juristförlaget, 2007) 211–24; Dirk
Heirbaut, ‘The Survival of the French Codiﬁcation in Belgium’ in L Zhang (ed), Codiﬁca-
tion, Decodiﬁcation and Anti-codiﬁcation of Civil Law (Cuplpress, 2008) 221–25.
101P Godding, ‘Peut-on parler d’un droit privé «belge» avant 1830?’ (1984) 70, ﬁfth series,
Académie royale de Belgique. Bulletin de la classe des lettres et des sciences morales et
politiques 270 (cited by Heirbaut [n 88]).
102According to this line of thought, before that time, Spain stricto sensu did not exist. They
think that what existed was Hispania (as a territory – or Province – under the Roman
Empire), the Hispanic Visigothic kingdom (568–711), the Hispanic Christian territories
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but not as much as the historical development of particular territories and people. It
might be more accurate to use the expression ‘Southern Netherlands’ to refer to the
history of Belgium before 1830, but this period still belongs – velis nolis – to the
history of Belgium.
As to whether Belgium has a national legal tradition after 1830, the answer
might depend on the meaning of the expression ‘national’. From a constitutional
perspective, the answer is afﬁrmative, inasmuch as Belgian laws have been
approved by the Belgian parliament or the legislative power, institutions in
which resides the national sovereignty of the state.
From a legal-cultural perspective, the answer is much harder but also afﬁrma-
tive. I fully agree with Heirbaut’s statement whereby ‘[i]t is hard to see how a
Belgian legal tradition could have come into existence with only French codes
and foreign scholars to nurture it’.103 Harshness means difﬁculty but not impossi-
bility. What seems impossible is the idea that there is an absence of a legal tra-
dition, even a somehow ‘national’ one. Does ‘national’ mean that the majority
of the state’s legal provisions should be autochthonous, stemming from your
own legal culture (old customs, legal institutions etc.), and not from foreign
lands? If yes, what is the percentage of autochthonous laws and legal institutions
required for the existence of a ‘national’ legal tradition? Or does a ‘national’ legal
tradition mean having a ‘uniﬁed law’? Is legal uniﬁcation a necessary requirement
for having a ‘national’ legal tradition? Is the plurality of laws or legal diversity a
weakness of a legal tradition, incompatible with a ‘national’ legal tradition? Does a
‘national’ legal tradition require a developed legal doctrine by autochthonous
scholars (rather than foreign)? I do not think so.
If law is a part of culture, and culture is an important part of a nation, I do not
see why a state cannot have a ‘national’ legal tradition if it went through a massive
legislative import (mainly French), that never achieved – perhaps nor pretended to
have – a uniﬁed law, and was not much developed– at least scholarly, not pragma-
tically – by autochthonous lawyers. In my view, only a prejudiced or biased notion
of the ‘national’ character of a legal tradition may lead us to deny it in some
nations like Belgium. It is understandable that some Belgian lawyers might feel
uneasy with the strong – or excessive – French inﬂuence over their own legal tra-
dition, or might lament that Belgian law never achieved a desirable degree of legal
uniﬁcation, that the nineteenth-century Laurent’s civil code project failed, or that
the rift between the two legal cultures of Belgium (the Dutch- and the French-
speaking one) is growing. However, such uneasiness should not obscure the
fact that all these realities are part of the national legal tradition of Belgium.
and kingdoms (in the context of the reconquest process, 722–1492), the Hispanic monarchy
(with Fernando of Aragon and Isabel of Castile, but particularly from Carlos I – or Vof the
Holy Roman Empire – onwards), but not Spain, and less as a nation. Others argue that Spain
as state started in the Early Modern period, with Carlos I of Spain (1516–1556).
103Heirbaut (n 88).
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Some might think that the ‘national’ legal tradition of Belgium is peculiar, and
from a ‘national’ perspective, a failure. I do not agree. The legal history of
Belgium shows the variety of medieval customs, municipal legislation and the par-
ticular reception of ius commune, as other European jurisdictions. The nineteenth-
century introduction of the Napoleonic codes did not imply an expulsion of
‘Belgian’ legal tradition, not only because many of the codes’ provisions came
from the ius commune, but also because the legal culture of Belgium prevented
the application of many legal provisions as it would be done in France. As is
well known, that is one of the main effects of any legal transplant.104 The ﬁnal
outcome of the same Code civil’s legal provision might considerably differ
when applied in France or in Belgium. This is particularly evident when analysing
the Belgian legal practice after the promulgation of codes. In this vein, the ﬁrst
generation of Belgian lawyers after the Napoleonic codiﬁcations continued to
quote the old customs and ius commune, the latter ‘in its Franco-Belgian
variant’, and the former ‘in a Franco-Belgian context’.105 This changed around
1830 with the second generation of lawyers, when ‘the old law was still quoted,
but it had lost its prestige’. Later on, in the 1860s, references to the old law dis-
appeared almost completely. However, this did not mean ‘that the legal rules them-
selves changed, but rather that they were put within the framework of French
codiﬁcations and that judges henceforward referred to their own precedents,
instead of the old law, which had gone underground’.106 In other words, many
of the traditional legal rules of the Southern Netherlands/Belgium – within the fra-
mework of French codes though – were still applied.
Moreover, despite the French legislative import, Belgium has never ceased to
approach law in a pragmatic way, and it is here where we can see a divergence
from the French inﬂuence. This pragmatic attitude towards law – ‘law has to be
practical’ – is something other than just ‘a general phenomenon in Belgium’.107
It is part of the Belgian culture in general and the Belgian legal culture(s) in
particular.
The existence of different legal cultures (in plural) in one nation (e.g. Belgium)
does not make the legal system (or tradition) less ‘national’. I rather think that, in
some territories, legal uniﬁcation might have the danger of diluting the notion that
law can be understood as part of culture. In this regard, Spain is the paramount
example. Spanish legal history shows the existence of several legal traditions,108
and this explains why the French inﬂuence in the civil-law codiﬁcation process did
104On this matter, see Watson, ‘Legal Transplants and European Private Law’ (n 83) 2–3,
where he states that ‘that the same legal rule operates differently in two countries… [I]t is
rules… that are borrowed, not the ‘spirit’ of a legal system.’
105Heirbaut and Storme (n 100) s 3 entitled ‘Legal Practice: Moving from Foreign to
Indigenous’.
106Ibid.
107Heirbaut (n 88).
108Masferrer, Spanish Legal Traditions (n 22); see also the references at n 3.
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not change this notable trait of the Spanish legal culture. Should this variety be
regarded as a weakness of a national legal tradition? Perhaps just from a rational-
istic and positivistic approach to law such richness can be seen as a weakness, as
something under-developed or incomplete.
Summing up, it is hard for me to accept that there is no Belgian legal tradition.
It might be less ‘Belgian’ than one may have wished, but nevertheless, it exists and
is perhaps richer and more complex than other legal traditions. Moreover, consid-
ering that Belgium has two distinctive legal cultures – the French- (Wallonia) and
Dutch-speaking one (Flanders), it might be even more appropriate to talk about
Belgian legal traditions (in plural). It is true that French- and Dutch-speaking
Belgium are different, but they still have more in common with one another
than with, for example, the Netherlands.
It might also be the case that the origin of the problem of linking national legal
tradition with ‘Belgium’ does not reside so much in the lack of a legal tradition but
in the uneasiness caused by the singular ‘Belgian’ label. It seems to me that a
formal recognition of two distinctive legal traditions in Belgium, the ‘Flemish’
legal tradition and the ‘French-speaking’ one, would be much more appealing
from a nationalistic perspective. If not, I can understand the reluctance to admit
the existence of a ‘Belgian’ legal tradition, precisely because law is part of legal
culture.
From a different perspective, the reluctance to accept the existence of a legal
tradition as ‘Belgian’ or ‘national’might also be due to the fact that ‘national’ legal
rules and institutions were supposed to be home-grown. Here a comparison with
customary law can be made – what makes something a custom is not only the idea
that it was made by the people. In many cases ‘customs’ were originally case law
or legislation. What turned them into custom was the acceptance by the people.
From this standpoint, it could be said that what makes Belgian law ‘national’ is
its acceptance by the people of Belgium. From this perspective, acceptance by
the country’s political institutions and/or people(s) would sufﬁce, but nobody
might deny that home-grown legal rules and institutions can be always more
easily regarded as ‘national’.
3. Romania
Unlike Belgium, in Romania scholars have no problem in recognising its national
legal tradition, despite the fact that Romania has belonged to three different legal
traditions. Romania gradually receded from being a part of the Byzantine legal tra-
dition and joined the Western legal tradition from the 1840s/1860s. Since 1948,
Romania joined the Socialist legal tradition. Eventually, since 1989, Romania
returned to the Western (Roman-Germanic) legal tradition.
The two Principalities which were the basis for the formation of the current
Romania were under the suzerainty of the Ottoman Empire since the ﬁfteenth
century, but without ever being a part of the Empire. The Romanian Principalities
were loyal in the political and commercial realms (paying the annual tribute), but
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were allowed to apply their local legal tradition in the provinces of both private
and public law. Both Principalities resorted to a set of unwritten rules – called
‘folk law’ or ‘custom of the land’ – which were sufﬁcient to settle legal
disputes.109
Note that in the Romanian Principalities (Romania, since 1862), in the period
between the fourteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century, two different
kinds of legal institutions were applied: those pertaining to the ‘custom of the land’
(an oral – non-written and organically developed legal tradition) and those pertain-
ing to the Byzantine law. The latter were transplanted by the Romanian princes
with the help of the Orthodox Church and were circulated in written codes
(pravila) containing laic and ecclesiastical/canonical legal provisions. In medieval
times, there were no rules for settling the competition between these two groups of
legal institutions. They were randomly applied by the Romanian courts. The
‘custom of the land’ was codiﬁed in the second half of the eighteenth century
and the beginning of the nineteenth century along with the Byzantine law,
mainly in two major codiﬁcations: Caragea Code (1918, in Wallachia) and Calli-
machi code (1817, in Moldavia). These codes, containing mainly civil law pro-
visions, were applied until 1865, when the Romanian Civil Code started to
produce effects.
In the nineteenth century,110 the Romanian political elite, who had been fasci-
nated with the French Revolution and longed for the introduction of French law in
Romania,111 decided to use legal transplants as a way to attain the desired social
and legal modernisation. In doing so, Romania went through massive legal
imports from Western European law, particularly from France and Belgium.
Summing up, the Belgian Constitution (1831) and the Napoleonic codes (1804–
10) were imported to the Romanian legal system, particularly in the period
1848 to 1866.112
109Manuel Gutan, ‘Building the Romanian Modern Law –Why Is It Based on Legal Trans-
plant?’ [2005] Acta Universitatis Lucian Blaga supp 130–43, esp 132–33.
110Romania went through the following historical periods: (1) under Ottoman occupation
since the sixteenth century (the two principalities Moldova and Wallachia); (2) under Hun-
garian and Austrian sovereignty until 1918 (Transylvania); (3) Personal union – under
Prince Alexandru Ioan Cuza (1859–66) – since 1859 (Moldova + Wallachia); (4) uniﬁed
and unitary state since 1862 (‘Romania’) and (5) Independent state since 1877–78.
111On this matter, see P Eliade, De l’inﬂuence française sur l’ésprit public en Roumanie.
Les origines (Ernest Leroux, 1898).
112Manuel Gutan, ‘Legal Transplant as a Socio-Legal Engineering in Modern Romania’ in
Michael Stolleis (ed), Konﬂikt und Koexistenz: Die Rechtordnungen Südosteuropas im 19
und 20 Jahrhundert (Band I: Rumänien, Bulgaries und Griechenland) (Vitorio Klosterman,
2015) 481–530, esp 488.
Gutan states that:
‘Being imported especially from the French and Belgian legal models, modernized
Romanian law covers all the branches of the legal system. The French Commercial
Code had already been imported in 1839. The French Civil Code and Criminal Code
124 A. Masferrer
As a consequence of the urgency of modernising law and society and of
gaining European legitimacy to consolidate Romania as a state, the Romanian pol-
itical elite decided to resort to legal transplants. The outcome of massive legal
transplants caused problems in the Romanian legal system. To put it simply, the
urgent need for legal modernisation led the Romanian political elite, who were
obsessed with France,113 to undertake biased and irrational legal transplants114
with the aid of ‘some European powers (especially France) [that] were willing
to support Romania’s political efforts towards political uniﬁcation, and there
was no time to waste in academic or scientiﬁc debates about the proper means
of modernisation’.115 This explains why the ﬁrst Romanian Constitution (1866)
was hardly linked to the national and constitutional culture of Romania,116 and
the Romanian Codes – particularly the Civil one (1864) – were adopted in parlia-
ment without debate or dialogue.117
The Civil code of 1864 mirrored neither the society nor the legal culture of
Romania. Moreover, it produced ‘cultural-dissolving effects, endangering the
romantic identitarian project of building the Romanian state and Romanian
nation around a unitary Romanian »national character / nature« (caracter
naţional)’.118 In Romania, then, the codiﬁcation based on the French model was
regarded as something worse than mere legal denationalisation. It somehow
revealed the weakness of the Romania legal tradition and, at the same time, it wea-
kened it further.119 In addition, it had ‘dissolving’ effects, giving birth to
a conﬂict between legal-cultural identities: on the one hand the legal-cultural identity
based on the Romanian legal tradition(s) and, on the other, the legal-cultural identity
were faithfully imported in 1864. The Belgian inﬂuence was no less present: the part
of the Civil Code regulating the law of obligations was taken from the Belgian civil
law, and the two important laws which modernized local public administration were
imported in 1864 from Belgian administrative law. Last but not least, the ﬁrst Roma-
nian Constitution was designed in 1866 under the important inﬂuence of the Belgian
Constitution of 1831.’
113Gutan, ‘Building’ (n 109) 133–35.
114Gutan, ‘Legal Transplant’ (n 112) 484 ff.
115Ibid, 486.
116Ibid, 497–98; on this matter, see Manuel Gutan, ‘The Challenges of the Romanian Con-
stitutional Tradition. I. Between Ideological Transplant and Institutional Metamorphoses’
(2013) 25 Journal of Constitutional History 223; Manuel Gutan, ‘The Challenges of the
Romanian Constitutional Tradition. II. Between Constitutional Transplant and (Failed) Cul-
tural Engineering’ (2013) 26 Journal of Constitutional History 217; Bianca Selejan-Gutan,
The Constitution of Romania: A Contextual Analysis (Hart Publishing, 2016) 7–10.
117Gutan, ‘Legal Transplant’ (n 112) 498; this is not that exceptional since in other jurisdic-
tions some codes were also approved without parliamentary debate, e.g. the Argentine Civil
Code (1871), as has been noted in Parise (n 8) 333.
118Gutan, ‘Legal Transplant’ (n 112) 503.
119Manuel Gutan, ‘Romanian Tradition in Legal Import: Between Necessity and Weakness’
in Impérialisme et chauvinisme juridiques. Rapports présentés au colloque à l’occasion du
20e anniversaire de l’Institut suisse de droit comparé (Schulthess, 2004) 65–79.
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underpinned by the Western European legal traditions. At the end of the day, the
“battleﬁeld” belonged to a third type of Romanian legal-cultural identity, a contro-
verted interplay between the two former identities.120
The irrationality of legal transplants by the Romanian political elite was ﬁer-
cely criticised by a nineteenth-century intellectual movement which dominated the
scholarly debate about ‘the interplay between tradition or culture and legal import
in the process of social, economic, political and legal modernisation’,121 or ‘the
interplay between law and society, about the imported law and socio-cultural back-
ground in the importing society’.122 They created the so-called theory of ‘forms
without substance’.123 Whereas ‘the “form” usually meant the cultural institutions,
generally, or legal institutions, particularly, imported from Western Europe, the
‘substance usually meant the general culture of Romanian society, its traditions,
mentality and behaviors’.124
The strong intellectual reaction against the Romanian civil code of 1864 by
scholars was fuelled in the theory of ‘forms without substance’. A ﬁerce debate
emerged about the modalities and limits of the transplant which occurred from
the French civil code of 1804. The Romanian civil code was not quite a direct
and faithful translation of the Code civil, but
a small-scale domesticated version of the French one, through the perpetuation of a
few traditional Romanian legal traditions, the concession to an important number of
the French Code’s articles and, last but not least, through the adaptation of the juri-
dical French language to a timid juridical Romanian language.
Manuel Gutan describes the ﬁnal outcome of the text as follows:
The result was rather puzzling, as the text was full of incoherence, lacunas and mis-
translations. It would have been better had the French Civil Code been faithfully
copied and translated into Romanian. Lacking a serious rational analysis of the inter-
play between what already existed and what should have been imported, the result
was completely dysfunctional. In this case, […], a faithful and complete legal
import would have been more advantageous than combining foreign legal insti-
tutions with domestic legal traditions.125
An example of legal-cultural disturbances that the legal import (Code civil)
created in the importing society (the Romanian one) was anti-clericalism. The
120Gutan, ‘Legal Transplant’ (n 112) 483.
121Ibid, 504.
122Ibid, 505.
123Ibid, 504ff; see also Manuel Gutan, ‘Le droit comparé contemporain et l’actualité de la
théorie des “formes sans fond” en Roumanie’ (2013) 3 Revue de droit international et de
droit compare 427; ‘Comparative Law in Romania: History, Present and Perspectives’
(2010) 1 Romanian Journal of Comparative Law 9, 53–70.
124Gutan, ‘Legal Transplant’ (n 112) 505.
125Ibid, 497.
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Romanian civil code imported French anti-clericalism and laicism to an Eastern
society where ‘an intimate and peaceful relationship traditionally existed
between church and state’,126 causing a notable negative reaction among Roma-
nian orthodox believers (particularly among the clerical body).
After the 1989 Revolution,127 a debate arose as to whether the Romanian 1865
civil code should be substantially amended or entirely abrogated. The conclusion
was that it should be abrogated and replaced by a new civil code. Consequently,
the new Romanian civil code entered into force in 2011 while the old civil code
of 1865 was abrogated. The problem resided in the sources of this new civil
code. The Romanian scholars who drew up the project were deeply indebted to
the civil code of Quebec from 1994. Although a detailed comparative analysis
of the Canadian and the Romanian texts needs to be done, the earlier drafts of
the new Romanian civil code were widely translated from the Quebec civil
code. The ﬁnal version, which is currently in force, has been profoundly trans-
planted from the Quebec civil code but – as said – further analyses would be
needed to precisely ascertain the extent of the legal transplant.
Thus, in re-codifying the civil law after the fall of communism, Romanian
scholars showed neither objection nor reluctance to resort to legal transplant.
On the contrary, the legal transplant was used in order to modernise Romanian
law after 1989. Romanian scholars had no problem with transplanting foreign
legal solutions.128 Today, the national legal identity, with which the pre-commu-
nist elites were obsessed, is no longer at stake. The Romanian scholars of today
have a very pragmatic attitude regarding law and legal transplants. They have
no problem with massively transplanting foreign solutions if they are deemed to
be useful to the Romanian legal system. Today, there does not seem to be any
protest against the fact that the contemporary Romanian legal system features
many transplanted foreign legal institutions which are not working within the
legal system itself. This is especially due to their foreignness. Generally, the
Romanian legal elite are continuing to frequently use the legal transplant
method like the Romanian elite of the nineteenth century did, but today there is
no intellectual reaction like the theory of ‘forms without substance’. Today, Roma-
nian scholars seem to be only interested in having a modernised post-communist
law, which is legitimising the presence of Romania in the EU and NATO.
Despite this, some Romanian scholars have extensively and accurately worked
on legal transplants, analysing their necessary conditions or requirements for their
success,129 to better understand the Romanian legal tradition and to learn from the
126Ibid, 510.
127As a curiosity, it should be recalled that Romania was the only communist country who
did not abrogate its bourgeois civil code during the socialist era.
128On this matter and the way the Romanian legal elite is approaching today the Western
legal culture, see Manuel Gutan, ‘Le droit civil roumain entre recodiﬁcation “nationale”
et uniformisation européenne’ (2008) 2 SUBB Jurisprudentia 171.
129Gutan, ‘Legal Transplant’ (n 112) 517–20.
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past. In this vein, the failures of the importation of foreign models in Romania
could have contributed to the emergence of comparative law studies and, more
speciﬁcally, to comparative legal history studies in Romania.130
III. Concluding considerations
Can the Spanish civil code be compared to other codes? Yes, it can. However, in
doing so, foreign models should be carefully employed. Otherwise, comparisons
might be misleading, misrepresenting the peculiarities of codes which somehow
reﬂect the identity and legal traditions of a nation. Did drafters of the Spanish
civil code use the French model and other foreign codes? Yes, but such recognition
should not lead to simplistic conclusions or general statements, whereby the
Spanish civil code, for example, is somehow a replication of some foreign
models. This might be true in some parts of the code (e.g. book of obligations
and contracts), where the Spanish drafters realised that the French model con-
tained the ius commune legacy (which had also been part of the Spanish legal tra-
dition). However, such a general statement would be completely wrong when
referring to the role of the code itself in the private law system, or to other substan-
tive parts of the code. The validity of extra-legal sources of law (e.g. custom)
would be an example of it.
Part of the responsibility of such misrepresentations belongs to Spanish legal
historians, for having neglected the study of the código civil from a more compara-
tive perspective. Had they done so, non-Spanish legal historians and comparative
lawyers would not be satisﬁed by simplistic views on the Spanish codiﬁcation of
civil law. Fortunately, at least some foreign scholars have been able to capture the
particular peculiarities of the Spanish civil code, recognising the ‘originality of the
Spanish theory of sources’ and that ‘the Code remain[ed] loyal to Spanish
traditions’.131
130Manuel Gutan, Transplant constituțional și constitutionalism în statul roman modern
[Constitutional Transplant and Constitutionalism in Modern Romania 1802–1866]
(Editura Hamangiu, 2013); particularly remarkable is the creation of the Romanian
Journal of Comparative Law and the ‘Editorial’ in Gutan, ‘Comparative Law in
Romania’ (n 123).
131L Neville Brown, ‘The Sources of Spanish Civil Law’ (1956) 5 The International and
Comparative Law Quarterly 364, 364–65:
‘Article 6 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 consists of two paragraphs. The ﬁrst
states that the court which refuses to reach a decision because of the silence, obscur-
ity or insufﬁciency of the laws (las leyes) incurs a legal liability. The second para-
graph explains how the judge is to escape from this dilemma: ‘When there is no
statute (ley) exactly applicable to the issue in question, one shall apply the custom
of the place (la costumbre del lugar) and, in default, the general principles of the
law (los principios generales de derecho).’
The two paragraphs read in conjunction show that the primary source of law is la ley:
in this the Code remains loyal to Spanish traditions and the principles of the modern
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The codiﬁcation movement did not contribute to enhance or promote a Belgian
legal tradition. However, it cannot be stressed enough that Belgium does indeed
have a legal tradition or, more accurately, legal traditions. Since Belgium has
two distinctive legal cultures – the French- (Wallonia) and Dutch-speaking one
(Flanders) – it might be even more appropriate to talk about Belgian legal tra-
ditions (in the plural). Although these two legal traditions are different, they
still have more in common with one another than with other European legal tra-
ditions (e.g. that of the Netherlands). The linkage of ‘Belgium’ with a ‘national’
legal tradition is somehow problematic, not because Belgium lacks a legal tra-
dition – which, though peculiar, still exists – but precisely because of the use of
the label ‘Belgian’ as representing the national reality. In this regard, since law
is part of legal culture, the formal recognition of two distinctive legal traditions
in Belgium, the ‘Flemish’ legal tradition and the ‘French-speaking’ legal tradition,
would be much more appealing from a nationalist perspective.
From a different perspective, the reluctance to accept the existence of a legal
tradition as ‘Belgian’ or ‘national’might also be due to the fact that ‘national’ legal
rules and institutions are supposed to be home-grown. Like customary law, it
could be said that what makes Belgian law ‘national’ is its acceptance by the
people of Belgium. From this perspective, acceptance by the country’s political
institutions and/or people(s) would sufﬁce, but it is understandable that home-
grown legal rules and institutions would be more easily regarded as ‘national’.
The Romanian codiﬁcation process was also more foreign than national.
Romanian Codes – and particularly, the Civil ones of 1864 and 2011 – mirrored
neither the society nor the legal culture of Romania. In Romania, codiﬁcation
brought with it the denationalisation of law, triggering ‘dissolving’ effects and
giving birth to a conﬂict between legal-cultural identities (the legal-cultural iden-
tity based on the Romanian legal tradition(s) and the Western legal-cultural iden-
tities, particularly those of France, Belgium and Quebec).
Romania is a very good example of how codiﬁcation in the context of dena-
tionalisation (i.e. massive transplantation of foreign legal solutions) could result
civilians. Only in the absence of a provision of la ley can one turn to the two ‘extra-
legal’ subsidiary sources indicated in the Code, namely, local custom and the general
principles of the law […].
In recognising local custom as a second source of legal rules the Code does not pre-
scribe the conditions which the particular custom may satisfy before the judge may
accept it as a rule of law applicable to the case before him. Rather these conditions
have been evolved by the jurists and the judges themselves in the manner of the
English law: it is not surprising that the list of conditions is very similar to that
required by English law.
In the absence of a provision of la ley or of a local custom Article 6 directs the judge
to apply the general principles of the law (los principios generales de derecho). The
purpose of this article is to examine this expression; its analysis will reveal the orig-
inality of the Spanish theory of sources and provide an interesting comparison with
both French and English law.
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from a necessity for change in particular circumstances (urgency of legal reform
and need of international legitimation, that existed both in the nineteenth
century and after the fall of communism), and how this could trigger particular
forms of (re)nationalisation. In the nineteenth century, the intellectual reaction
of ‘forms without substance’ envisaged a nationalisation of the Romanian civil
law by rejecting the denationalised Romanian civil code of 1865. The stringent
need to build a national legal identity had no time to wait for a nationalisation
through adaptation of the civil code to the Romanian society. Even more, this
kind of nationalisation was not a possible as decades went by, as the civil code
was felt as a foreign corpus in the rural world.
After the fall of communism, the (re)codiﬁcation through denationalisation was
again at stake, and occurred through transplantation from the Quebec civil code of
1994. But nationalisation or renationalisation of the foreign legal institutions has
lost its relevance, as the national legal identity is no longer at stake. In a very prag-
matic way, todayRomanians seem to be interested only in having an up-to-date civil
law, a modernised codiﬁcation and the applause of EU ofﬁcials.132
The study of comparative legal history is probably the best way to ensure that
legal transplants are properly done, without causing the annihilation of a legal tra-
dition. In other words, it enables the drafting of laws and undertaking of legal
reforms that enhance social and national cohesion. If properly done, codes and
legal reforms might genuinely express a legal culture and contribute to its
mature and organic development. To put it simply, comparative legal history
studies can contribute to having and regarding laws in general and codes in par-
ticular as authentic expressions of a legal tradition or culture.
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